Back in the day the US government would give you $20k-60k cash in a nice briefcase for this type of exploit. Just another thing big tech has ruined I suppose.
Apple gave me $47k back when I was 16 and it definitely changed my life. Was subsequently able to get out of my 3rd world country and pay for university in the UK. While the quality of education is disappointing, having a graduate visa makes it so much easier to get a job or start a business there.
No not to individuals. There are absolutely contracts you can score for certain attack surfaces but that usually involves going through a company. If this person is from the united states, they will absolutely land themselves a good scholarship and a very well-paid job with a security clearance.
The book "This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends" by Nicole Perlroth, while it's about the history of cyberweapons it does a very good job detailing the late 90s to early 2010s exploit market.
I don't have it in front of me, but I'm talking about the "nobody but us" era of exploit markets:
Where the NSA seemingly was buying anything, even if not worthwhile, as a form of "munitions collection" to be used for the future attacks.
edit: this mostly ended in the US because other nations started paying more, add in more regulations (only a handful companies are allowed to sell these exploits internationally) and software companies starting to do basic security practices (along with ruling out their own bug bounties), it just mostly whimpered away.
Also relevant to the discussion, the book discusses how the public exploit markets are exploitive to the workers themselves (low payouts when state actors would pay more) and there are periods of times where there would be open revolts too (see 2009 "No More Free Bugs" movement, also discussed in the book).
Definitely worth it if you aren't aware of this history, I wasn't.
I haven't read her book, am myself somewhat read in to the background here, and if she's claiming NSA was stockpiling serverside web bugs, I do not believe her.
In reality, intelligence agencies today don't even really stockpile mobile platform RCE. The economics and logistics are counterintuitive. Most of the money is made on the "backend", in support/update costs, paid in tranches; CNE vendors have to work hard to keep up with the platforms even when their bugs aren't getting burned. We interviewed Mark Dowd about this last year for the SCW podcast.
Maybe there is a misunderstanding, I'm not saying that the NSA would be buying XSS scripts. I'm saying that if this was 35 years ago the NSA would be buying exploits with common user software. Back then the exploits were "lesser" but there still was a market and not every exploit that was bought was a wonder of software engineering. Nowadays the targeted market is the web and getting exploits on some of the most used sites would be worthy of buying.
Kid was simply born in the wrong era to cash out easy money.
I think you're wrong about this. 35 years ago was 1990. Nobody was selling vulnerabilities in 1990 at all. By 1995, I was belting out memory corruption RCEs (it was a lot easier then), and there was no market for them at all. And there has never been a market for web vulnerabilities like XSS.
Building reliable exploits is very difficult today, but the sums a reliable exploit on a mainstream mobile platform garner are also very high. Arguably, today is the best time to be doing that kind of work, if you have the talent.
I can't imagine intelligence agencies/DoD not doing this with their gargantuan black budgets, if it's relevant to a specific target. They already contract with private research centers to develop exploits, and it's not like they're gonna run short on cash
If that were the case, we'd routinely see mysterious XSS exploits on social networks. The underlying bugs are almost always difficult to target! And yet we do not.
The biggest problem, again, is that the vulnerabilities disappear instantaneously when the vendors learn about them; in fact, they disappear in epsilon time once the vulnerabilities are used, which is not how e.g. a mobile browser drive-by works.
They have a class of attacks which are used for targeted intrusion into foreign entities. Typically espionage or cyberwarfare, so they're not often used (they're aware they might be a one-use attack), but some persist for a long time. Foreign entities also tend not to admit to the attacks when found, so if the vendor is a US entity, often the vendor doesn't find out. We do the same; when our intelligence agencies find out about a US compromise, they often keep mum about it.
I'm not talking about XSS specifically, I mean in general. An XSS isn't usually high-value, but if it affects the right target, it can be very valuable. Imagine an XSS or CSRF vuln in a web interface for firmware for industrial controls used by an enemy state, or a corporation in that state. It might only take 2 or 3 vectors to get to that point and then you have remote control of critical infrastructure.
Oh - and the idea that a vendor will always patch a hole when they find it? Not completely true. I have seen very suspicious things going on at high value vendors (w/their products), and asked questions, and nobody did anything. In my experience, management/devs are often quite willing to ignore potential compromise just to keep focusing on the quarterly goals.
Are these things you think it stands to reason the IC must be doing, or things you know for a fact that they are doing? It stands to reason for a lot of people that the IC must stockpile vulnerabilities, but they don't (they keep just a couple working ones) --- just as an example of counterintuitive things about how CNE works.
It's partly fact, partly reasoning. One fact comes from STUXnet and Snowden Leaks, where they developed and deployed vulns that persisted for years without notice. The other fact is I've interviewed at the research centers and my eyes got pretty wide at the stuff they told me without an NDA, so they're definitely paying a lot to develop and acquire more vulns/new attacks. That was all 20 years ago, but the contracts are still there so there's no reason to suppose it stopped. There's also past NSA directors that've spoken at DEFCON for years about how they want more hackers, and the new cold war with China and Russia has been ongoing for nearly as long.
I'm not saying they stockpile vulns; I'm saying if somebody on the dark web said they had a vuln for sale for $50k, and it could help an agency penetrate China/Iran strategically, it would make no sense to turn it down, when they already pay many times more money to try to develop similar vulns.
You are here implicitly comparing Stuxnet and BULLRUN, two of the most sophisticated and expensive CNE operations ever conducted, with an XSS in Discord.
Why would YOU see a mystery XSS exploit on a social network? The idea of the DoD scoring these little exploits in a box is usually to deploy in a highly controlled and specific manner. You as a layperson is of no interest to them unless you are some kind of intelligence asset or foreign adversary
detected: WAF caught or detected the attack and raised an alert, post-exploitation
discovered: they audited or pentested themself and found out, preemptively
I just mean that Coinbase didn’t see anything happening and didn’t take action though the boy successfully exploited the vulnerability on their live system.
