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I seem to recall that rowhammer was known- but thought impossible for userland code to implement.

This is a huge theme for vulnerabilities. I almost said "modern" but looking back I've seen the cycle (disregard attacks as strictly hypothetical. Get caught unprepared when somebody publishes something making it practical) happen more than a few times.



someone did a javascript rowhammer in 2015, hardware that's vulnerable today is just manufacturers and customers deciding they don't want to pay for mitigation

(personally I think all RAM in all devices should be ECC)


We don't want "mitigation", we want true correctness --- or at least the level of perfection achievable before manufacturers thought they could operate with negative data integrity margins and convinced others that it was fine (one popular memory testing utility made RH tests optional and hidden by default, under the reasoning that "too many DIMMs would fail"!) All DRAM generations before DDR2 and early DDR3 didn't have this problem.

RAM that doesn't behave like RAM is not RAM. It's defective. ECC is merely an attempt at fixing something that shouldn't've made it to the market in the first place. AFAIK there is a RH variant that manages to flip bits undetectably even with ECC RAM.


> AFAIK there is a RH variant that manages to flip bits undetectably even with ECC RAM.

Single Error Correction, Double Error Detection, Tripple Error Chaos.


> manufacturers and customers deciding they don't want to pay

It's more of a tragedy-of-the-commons problem. Consumers don't know what they don't know and manufacturers need to be competitive with respect to each other. Without some kind of oversight (industry standards bodies or goverment regulation), or a level of shaming that breaks through to consumers (or e.g. class action lawsuits that impact manufacturers), no individual has any incentive to change.


Shame is an underrated way towards pushing for better standards. The problem is getting people in the know, and having them vote with their wallet, or at least public sentiment (social media pressure).


The manufacturers tried to sweep it under the rug when the first RowHammer came out. One of the memory testing utilities added tests for it, and then disabled those because they would cause too many failures.


The manufacturers chose this. Most customers were not offered a choice.

It should be considered unethical to sell machines with non-ECC memory in any real volume.


You dont have to buy them.


I'm coming back to note: die shrinks, density increase, and frequency increases- while keeping costs from going out of control all work together to make rowhammer inevitable. I maintain they knew about it, dismissed it as impractical, tested if it was a concern in normal usage... and were surprised + hobbled by their pants, when a PoC hit the public.

I'm not versed in silicon fabrication to know if theres ameliorations involved past what hit the press near 20 years ago now. But, while deep diving modern DRAM for an idea, its shocking how small a change is needed to corrupt a Bit in DRAM.


Manufacturers aren’t held liable for negligence like this. It’s a classic case of economic externality.


Yes it is - how would you go about fixing that?


Only means might be cultural. Security conferences such as DefCon or Black Hat create list of insecurely technology that is ubiquitousness and ignored by product designers and OEMs. Vote on ranking their priority and when they should be removed.

News would latch on to "Hacks say all computers without ECC RAM are vulnerable and should not be purchased for their insecurity. Manufacturers like Dell, Asus, Acer, ... are selling products that help hackers steal your information." "DefCon Hackers thank Nvidia for making their jobs easier ..."

Such statements would be refreshed during / after each security conference. There are over 12 conferences a year, about once a month these would be brought back into the public as a reminder. Public might stop purchasing from those manufacturers or choose the secure products to create the change.




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